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A global market is developing for the shares of an increasing portion of
the world’s 41,000 publicly-traded issuers.1 This trend has given rise to an
active debate concerning what United States policy should be toward
regulation of their disclosure practices.2 This Article is a comment on this

* Alene & Allen F. Smith Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1968,
J.D. 1971, Ph.D. (Economics) 1980, Yale University. The author wishes to express his appreciation for
the helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article to Professors James Cox and Donald Langevoort
and to Mr. Richard Walker. My appreciation goes as well to the valuable research assistance provided
by Catherine Jones. Financial support for this project was provided by the Cook Fund of the University
of Michigan.
1. I NTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, EMERGING STOCK MARKETS, FACTBOOK1998, at
23 (1998).
2. See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Burton G. Malkiel, Redundant Regulation of Foreign
Security Trading and U.S. Competitiveness, in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION :
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL P ERSPECTIVES 35-51 (Kenneth Lehn & Robert Kamphuis, eds. 1996); Richard
Cameron Blake, Advising Clients on Using the Internet to Make Offers of Securities in Offshore
Offerings, 55 BUS. LAW . 177 (1999); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity:
Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL . L. REV. 903 (1998); John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance
and Its Implications, 93 N W . U. L. REV. 641 (1999); James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S.
Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200 (1999) [hereinafter Regulatory Duopoly]; James A.
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debate through the eyes of an active participant.3
A review of the debate reveals five basic approaches to the question of
proper U.S. policy. 4
-Issuer Nationality. The United States should retain its existing
mandatory disclosure regime and impose this regime on each issuer that has
the United States as its economic center of gravity. Under this approach, the
location of transactions in the issuer’s shares and the residency of the persons
engaging in these transactions are irrelevant.
-Transaction Location. The United States should retain its existing
mandatory disclosure regime, but should impose this regime on all issuers
where a significant number of transactions in their shares are effected in the
United States. Under this approach, the nationality of the issuer and the
residence of the investors transacting in its shares are irrelevant.
-Investor Residency. The United States should retain its existing
mandatory disclosure regime, but should impose this regime on all issuers
where a significant number of investors transacting in its shares are U.S.
residents. The nationality of the issuer and the location of transactions in its

Fanto, The Absence of Cross-Cultural Communication: SEC Mandatory Disclosure and Foreign
Corporate Governance, 17 NW . J. INT’ L L. & BUS. 119 (1996); Franklin R. Edwards, Listing Foreign
Securities on U.S. Exchanges, 5 J. APPLIED CORP . FIN. 28 (1993); Oren Fürst, A Theoretical Analysis
of the Investor Protection Regulations Argument for Global Listing of Stocks, unpublished paper on
file with the author (1998); Uri Geiger, The Case for the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules
in the Global Market, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 241 (1997); Roberta S. Karmel, Changing Concepts
of Extraterritoriality, N.Y. L.J. Jan. 30, 1998 at 1, 3; Edward F. Greene et al., Hegemony or
Deference: U.S. Disclosure Requirements in the International Capital Markets, 50 BUS. LAW. 413
(1995); J. William Hicks, Protection of Individual Investors Under U.S. Securities Laws: The Impact
of International Regulatory Competition, 1 GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. J. 431 (1994); Amir N. Licht,
International Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to Convergence, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 227 (1998) [hereinafter International Diversity]; Amir N. Licht, Games
Commissions Play: 2x2 Games of International Securities Regulation, 24 Y ALE I NT’L L. 61(1999)
[hereinafter Games]; Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (1999); Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible
Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, unpublished paper on file with the author (1999);
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J.
2359 (1998); Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings:
Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 M ICH . J. INT’ L L. 207
(1999); Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction in International
Securities Regulation, unpublished paper on file with the author (1999).
3. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate
Whom, 95 M ICH . L. REV. 2498 (1997) [hereinafter Disclosure in a Globalizing Market]; Merritt B.
Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market for
Securities, 97 M ICH . L. REV. 696 (1998) [hereinafter Political Economy]; Merritt B. Fox, Retaining
Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV.
1335 (1999) [hereinafter Retaining Mandatory Disclosure].
4. While many participants in the debate take positions that weave together two or more of
these approaches, the categorization set below forms a useful way to describe their positions and
examine their underlying premises.
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shares are irrelevant with this approach.
-International Uniformity. The United States should work with other
countries to develop a globally uniform disclosure regime. One way to
accomplish this would be through each country adopting substantively
identical rules (“harmonization”) that would then be applied by national
governments in accordance with any of the three principles of jurisdictional
reach outlined above. Another way would be to establish an international
agency that would develop and apply its own regime, which would replace
the existing nationally based regimes.
-Issuer Choice. The United States regime should no longer be mandatory.
Under this approach, any issuer, U.S. or foreign, can avoid the U.S. regime if
it chooses instead to subject itself to the regime of one of the fifty states or of
any other country.
I have taken the position in prior writings that, with certain limited
exceptions, the United States should adhere exclusively to the first approach,
that of issuer nationality. 5 Thus, as a general matter, the United States should
apply its regime to all U.S. issuers and no others, even if their shares are
publicly offered in the U.S. or listed on a U.S. exchange and even if a
significant number of investors transacting abroad in their shares are U.S.
residents. Commentators who disagree with this position adhere, at least in
part, to one or more of the other four approaches. Current U.S. practice
consists of a mix of the first three approaches.6 In Part I of this Article, I
briefly revie w why I advocate the issuer nationality approach. In Part II, I
evaluate the positions of other commentators who share my assumption that
the nationally based mandatory system of disclosure should, or as a realistic
matter will, be continued but disagree with issuer nationality as the way to
determine the reach of each country’s regime. In Part III, I evaluate the
position of commentators who disagree with issuer nationality because they
believe the whole system of nationally based mandatory disclosure should be
abandoned, either in favor of international uniformity or in favor of issuer
choice. I conclude in Part IV with a discussion of what I believe are the open
issues.

5. See supra note 3. For other adherents of this approach, see Greene et al., supra note 2;
Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 2.
6. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 3, at 705-17.
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I. THE REASONS FOR CHOOSING AN ISSUER NATIONALITY APPROACH
A. Choosing a Policy on the Basis of a Regulatory Incidence Analysis
Put aside for the moment consideration of the international uniformity
and issuer choice approaches and assume for a moment that the United States
will retain its existing mandatory disclosure regime. We must therefore
develop out of the three remaining approaches—issuer nationality,
transaction location and investor residency—a principle of jurisdictional
reach for deciding to which issuers the U.S. regime should be applied. In my
view, the appropriate way to develop such a principle of jurisdictional reach
is to undertake a regulatory incidence analysis. We need to identify which of
the world’s issuers are the ones for which the United States is the country
where the benefits of good regulation of their disclosure, and the costs of bad
regulation of their disclosure, are concentrated.
A principle that involves applying the U.S. regime to the issuers so
identified and to no others is most likely to satisfy the twin U.S. goals of
maximizing U.S. economic welfare and minimizing conflict with other
countries. It is also the principle most likely to maximize global economic
welfare.
As will be developed below, these issuers turn out to be the issuers whose
economic center of gravity as a firm is the United States, i.e., issuers for
which the United States is the location of their headquarters and their greatest
concentration of physical capital and employees and is where their
entrepreneurs at the time of founding resided. 7 Throughout this paper, a firm
having these characteristics is what I refer to as a “U.S. national”; a firm’s
country of incorporation is not the primary factor in the definition.

7. Most of t he world’s issuers, even ones labeled “multinational,” still have a distinct nationality
of this sort in some country (particularly if the EC is for these purposes treated as a single country). In
1990, profits from foreign operations of U.S. corporations amounted to only about one-sixth of all
corporate profits. See 72 SURV. CURRENT BUS. No. 12 at 14 NIPA Table 6.16C (1992). In 1989,
overseas assets of even U.S. corporations designated as “multinational” were only about one-fifth of
their total assets. See J. Lowe & R. Mataloni, Jr., U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: 1989 Benchmark
Survey Results, 71 SURV. CURRENT BUS. No. 10 at 29 (1991) (data from Table 1). I will briefly
consider exceptions to this generalization—truly multinational companies such as Daimler-Chrysler
and BP Amoco—in Part IV infra.
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B. Why the Issuer Nationality Approach Best Identifies where the Benefits
and Costs of Disclosure Regulation are Concentrated
1. The Benefits and Costs of Disclosure
Additional issuer disclosure produces social benefits by improving how
proposed new investment projects in the real economy are selected for
implementation and the way existing projects are operated. 8 Additional
disclosure produces these social benefits directly when an issuer
contemplates implementing a new project by means of a new stock offering.
Because of the disclosure-induced increase in the accuracy of the price at
which the shares will be sold, the firm’s cost of capital is brought more in
line with the social cost of investing society’s scarce savings in the
contemplated project and so these savings are more efficiently allocated. 9
Additional disclosure produces these social benefits through a second
route as well, which is unrelated to whether the issuer is offering new shares,
by increasing the effectiveness of several of the devices that limit the extent
to which managers of public corporations place their own interests above
those of their shareholders. To start, additional disclosure assists in the
effective exercise of the shareholder franchise and in shareholder
enforcement of management’s fiduciary duties.10 It also increases the threat
of hostile takeover when managers engage in non-share-value-maximizing
behavior. This is because the additional disclosure both makes a takeover less
risky for potential acquirers and reduces the chance that a value-enhancing
acquisition will be deterred by the target having an inaccurately high share
price.11 Finally, by reducing the riskiness associated with holding an issuer’s

8. I have discussed this point in more detail elsewhere. See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing
Market, supra note 3, at 2544-50. See also Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Cost of
“Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977 (1992); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a
Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995).
9. See Fox, Retaining Issuer Disclosure, supra note 3, at 1358-63.
10. See Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 L. & CONTEMP.
P ROBS. 113 (1999). In the United States, we are so accustomed to a high level of issuer disclosure that
we tend not to appreciate its importance with respect to t hese devices. A comparison with Russia is
revealing. There, the dearth of disclosure renders the fiduciary duties nominally imposed on
management almost useless. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of
Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996). It also makes relatively meaningless disinterested
shareholder approval of transactions in which management is interested. See Merritt B. Fox & Michael
A. Heller, Corporate Governance Lessons from Russian Fiascos, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1720 (2000).
11. The market for corporate control is a well-recognized device for limiting the agency costs of
management where ownership is separated from control, as in the typical publicly held corporation.
More information and the resulting increase in price accuracy improves the control market’s
effectiveness in performing this role. A potential acquirer, in deciding whether it is worth paying what
it would need to pay to acquire a target that the acquirer feels is mismanaged, must make an
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stock in a less than fully diversified portfolio, additional disclosure increases
the use of share price based management compensation, which also helps
align the interests of managers and shareholders.12 Additional disclosure
entails social costs as well, however, in terms of both the out-of-pocket
expenses that an issuer incurs for such items as lawyers, accountants and
printing and the staff time required to produce the needed information.
As a result of these benefits and costs, an issuer’s level of disclosure
affects the real returns it generates. An issuer has a socially optimal level of
disclosure, the level at which the marginal social benefits just equal the
marginal social costs. If a country’s issuers disclose at their optimal level,
this will maximize the disclosure-induced enhancement to returns generated
by capital-utilizing enterprises in that country.
2. The Incidence of Benefits and Costs
In an efficient market, an issuer’s share price takes into account the effect
of the issuer’s particular disclosure regime on its future expected cash flow.
At the same time, because globalization makes capital relatively mobile
internationally, competitive forces push capital toward receiving a single
global expected rate of return (adjusted for risk). Thus, investors in all the
world’s issuers tend to get the same risk adjusted expected return even
though issuer disclosure practices may vary widely from one country to the
next. The higher returns that result from a country’s issuers disclosing at their
optimal level therefore go largely to the suppliers of the issuers’ le ss mobile
factors of production, their entrepreneurs, who will get higher prices when
they sell shares in the firms they founded, and labor, who are likely to enjoy
higher wages in an economy where capital is allocated and used efficiently.

assessment of what t he target would be worth in the acquirer’s hands. This assessment is inherently
risky and the acquirer’s management is likely to be risk averse. Greater disclosure, however, reduces
the riskiness of this assessment. Hence, with greater disclosure, a smaller apparent deviation between
incumbent management decisionmaking and what would maximize share value is needed to impel a
potential acquirer to action.
Also, when share price is inaccurately high, even a potential acquirer that believes for sure that it
can run the target better than incumbent management may find the target not worth the price. The
increase in share price accuracy that results from greater disclosure reduces the chance that a socially
worthwhile takeover will be thwarted in this fashion.
Greater disclosure thus makes the hostile takeover threat more real. Incumbent managers will be
less tempted to implement negative net present value projects in order to maintain or enlarge their
empires or to operate existing projects in ways that sacrifice profits to satisfy their personal aims.
Those that nevertheless do these things are more likely to be replaced. See, MERRITB. FOX, FINANCE
AND I NDUSTRIAL P ERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC E CONOMY : T HEORY , PRACTICE, AND POLICY 84-91
(1987).
12. See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 3, at 2548-50.
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Thus, the persons in the world who primarily benefit from higher real returns
when a country’s issuers disclose at their optimal level are the country’s
entrepreneurial talent and labor, who are residents of the country, not the
investors in these issuers.13
The reader may ask whether this analysis ignores another benefit of
mandatory disclosure—investor protection—which will be concentrated
where an issuer’s investors are concentrated. The answer is no, because
investor protection is not a sound justification for mandatory disclosure:
disclosure is not necessary to protect investors against either unfair prices or
risk. Consider first unfair prices. Under the efficient market hypothesis,
securities prices are unbiased whether there is a great deal of information
available about an issuer or very little. In other words, share prices will on
average equal the actual value of the shares involved whether issuers are
required to produce a lot of disclosure or only a little. Thus, greater
disclosure is not necessary to protect investors from buying their shares at
prices that are, on average, unfair, i.e., greater than their actual values.
Now consider risk. With less information available about an issuer, share
price, while still unbiased, is less accurate, i.e., it is more likely to be
significantly off one way or the other from the share’s actual value. For an
investor with a less than fully diversified portfolio, greater share price
inaccuracy can make the portfolio more risky. High quality disclosure would,
to some extent, protect such an investor by reducing this risk. The investor,
however, can protect herself much more effectively and at less social cost by

13. If a country’s issuers represent only a small portion of all equities available to investors in the
world, investors would share in none of these gains. The country would be analogous to a single small
firm in a perfectly competitive industry. Such a firm’s level of production has no effect on price.
Following this analogy, what the country produces is investment opportunities—dollars of future
expected cash flow—just like the firm produces products. A disclosure improvement’s positive effects
on managerial motivation and choice of real investment projects will increase the number of dollars of
future expected cash flow that the country has to sell. This benefits the entrepreneurs, who are selling
the cash flow, and labor, who gain from the overall increase in the country’s economic efficiency. See
Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 3, at 2561-69. Because the country is like a small
firm, however, the increase in the amount supplied is not great enough to lower the price at which a
dollar of future expected cash flow is sold. Thus there is no benefit to investors, the “buyers” of these
dollars of expected future cash flow.
If a country’s issuers represent a substantial portion of all equities available to investors in the
world, as is the case with the United States, investors will share in some of these gains. A disclosure
improvement’s increase in the number of dollars of fut ure expected cash flow that the country has to
offer would be great enough to lower the price at which a dollar of future expected cash flow is sold, at
least slightly. Thus, investors would gain from the improvement. This is equally true of foreign
invest ors as U.S. investors, however, and foreign investors own almost two -thirds of all the shares of
publicly traded issuers in the world. See id. at 2525 n.51. And it is equally true of disclosure
improvements of U.S. issuers whose shares are primarily sold t o, or traded among, only foreign
investors as it is of U.S. issuers with primarily U.S. shareholders. For a more detailed discussion of
these points, see id. at 2552-80 and Fox, Political Economy, supra note 3, at 732-39.
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simply diversifying more.14
This reasoning shows that no matter how globalized equity investing
becomes, the benefits of good disclosure practices by U.S. issuers will
remain concentrated in the United States and the benefits of good disclosure
practices by issuers abroad will remain concentrated in their respective home
countries.15 This reasoning also shows that the location of transactions in an
issuer’s shares is simply irrelevant to where the benefits and costs of the
issuer’s disclosure practices accrue. A regulatory incidence analysis therefore
suggests that the U.S. regime should be applied to all U.S. issuers, wherever
their shares are offered or traded, and should not be applied to issuers of any
other nationality, even when their shares are offered or traded in significant
volume in the United States or purchased abroad by significant numbers of
U.S. investors.
It should be understood that an issuer nationality based system of
allocating jurisdictional reach among countries makes no assumption about
whether regulation is needed at all. It simply allocates to the government of
every issuer’s home country the decisions concerning whether or not the
issuer will be required to disclose and, if it is so required, the extent of that
requirement. Having said this, if there is a need for regulation (as I believe

14. In portfolio theory terms, issuer disclosure reduces firm specific (“unsystematic”) risk. Firm
specific risk can be completely eliminated by sufficient diversification. See Barbara Banoff,
Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L.
REV. 135 (1984).
15. To the extent that globalization has not yet proceeded far enough to fully result in a single
global risk adjusted expected rate of return on capital, the remaining market segmentation simply
reinforces the point that the gains from a country’s issuers disclosing at their optimal levels will be
concentrated at home. A country whose issuers disclose at the optimal level of disclosure will have
capital utilizing enterprises that produce higher returns net of costs of disclosure. If the single rate
assumption is correct, the gains from getting the disclosure level right will be primarily enjoyed by the
less mobile claimants on these returns, domestic entrepreneurs and labor, not by the suppliers of
capital, who, wherever in the world they live, will at best enjoy a slight increase in the overall global
expected return on capital. See supra note 13. If the assumption is incorrect, the reason would be that
each country’s investors still have a degree of bias against issuers from other countries. In that event,
U.S. investors, for example, might share disproportionately in the gains from moving the U.S. issuer
disclosure level toward its optimal level. The bias of foreign investors against U.S. issuers would mean
that the increase in the number of expected dollars of future cash flow resulting from the change in
required disclosure would be offered to a somewhat restricted market and push their price down more
for U.S. investors than for other investors. Id. To the extent that a U.S. issuer has U.S. shareholders,
the fact that U.S. investors will share disproportionately in the gains from optimal disclosure simply
creates an additional U.S. interest in the level of the issuer’s disclosure. As for a hypothetical U.S.
issuer whose shares are sold to and traded among only foreign investors, entrepreneurs and labor in the
United States would, just as if there were a single global expected rate of return on capital, enjoy most
of the gains from optimal disclosure. See Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra
note 3, at 2561-69. Thus, the United States’ interest in the disclosure behavior of even this second kind
of issuer would be as strong as it is shown to be under the assumption in the text.
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there is 16 ), it obviously arises from the fear that without regulation, issuers
will disclose at less than a socially optimal level, not from a belief that they
will disclose too much.
3. The Harm from Taking Transaction Location into Account
It also should be noted that, while the location of transactions in an
issuer’s shares is irrelevant to where the costs and benefits of the issuer
disclosure practices are felt, the mistaken belief that transaction location is
relevant actually can harm U.S. interests if the belief leads to transaction
location being counted as a factor in deciding whether to apply the U.S.
regime to any given issuer. Two types of harm arise. First, assuming that the
United States acts in its own rational best interests in its decision to require
disclosure and in its choice of required level, the transaction location
approach gives the managers of U.S. issuers an opportunity to exercise their
preference to disclose less than is socially desirable by making an offering, or
promoting trading in its shares, exclusively abroad in a country with less
strict requirements.17 Second, the transaction location approach needlessly
reduces the volume of transactions effected in the U.S. by scaring away
foreign issuers whose managers would gladly offer their issuers’ securities in
the United States, or have them trade there, but for the fact that their issuers
would be required to disclose more. This hurts the U.S. securities industry
and increases the cost and difficulty for U.S. investors to pursue many
foreign investment opportunities.18 The fact that some foreign issuers find it
advantageous to impose the stricter U.S. regime on themselves in no way
undermines this point since these issuers can voluntarily choose to impose
the U.S. regime on themselves anyway. 19
4. Conclusion
In sum, the argument for the issuer nationality approach is as follows:
-The United States does have strong interest in the disclosure behavior of
all U.S. issuers, even those whose shares are sold to, or traded among,
foreigners. If U.S. issuers disclose at their socially optimal level, the benefits
in terms of the resulting increased real returns will accrue primarily to U.S.

16.
17.
points.
18.
points.
19.

See Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 3.
See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 3, at 745-54 for a more detailed discussion of these
See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 3, at 754-57 for a more detailed discussion of these
See Part I.C.3. infra.
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entrepreneurs and labor. The investors in these issuers will receive the global
risk-adjusted expected rate of return regardless of the disclosure practices of
U.S. issuers.
-The United States does not have a strong interest in the disclosure
behavior of any foreign issuers, even those that are sold to, or traded among,
U.S. residents. Whether or not the U.S. regime applies to these issuers, U.S.
investors who purchase their shares will receive the global risk adjusted rate
of return.
-The location of transactions in an issuer’s shares is simply irrelevant to
whether the U.S. has an interest in an issuer’s disclosure behavior. Taking
location into account in determining whether to apply the U.S. regime to the
issuer actually harms United States interests by providing a means for U.S.
issuers to evade U.S. regulation and by scaring away foreign issuers from
markets located in the United States.
C. Qualifications
My suggestion that the United States exclusively utilize the issuer
nationality approach to statutory reach is subject to three qualifications.
1. Foreign Issuer IPOs in the United States
The first qualification concerns an initial public offering (IPO) by a nonpublicly traded foreign company to U.S. investors. The U.S. new issue
regime should be applied to such a transaction because there is no assurance
that the price at which such securities would be sold absent this regulation
would necessarily reflect the effect on the issuer’s expected future cash flow
of only being bound by its home country’s presumably less rigorous
disclosure system. 20 One reason for concern is that the mechanisms needed to
generate price efficiency in the market for IPOs are more complicated, and
their existence less well established empirically, than the mechanisms that
appear to generate price efficiency in secondary markets. A second concern
is that some of the relevant empirical literature suggests that even U.S. issuer
IPOs in the United States are priced inefficiently high. In contrast, a new
share offering to U.S. investors by an established publicly traded foreign
issuer does not raise these concerns, because the offering’s price will be
determined primarily by the prevailing price in the secondary market for the
issuer’s already outstanding shares.

20. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 3, at 742-43 for a more detailed discussion of the
points in the subsection.
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2. New Issue and Periodic Disclosure by Issuers from Developing
Countries and Newly Emerging Economies
Although there is substantial evidence that many foreign secondary
markets display the same kind of efficiency as those in the U.S., the testing of
this proposition, especially with respect to markets outside Europe, is
certainly not as extensive as with U.S. markets. We cannot be sure that the
more immature markets found in developing countries and newly emerging
economies have the same level of efficiency as markets in the United States
and Europe. Moreover, the mechanisms that appear to generate price
efficiency in the United States and Europe are not as firmly in place in such
markets. Caution again suggests that at least initially the issuer nationality
approach not be extended to issuers whose shares trade primarily in these
markets.21
3. Foreign Issuer Option to Adopt the U.S. System
Under the issuer nationality approach, foreign issuers are not required to
comply with the U.S. disclosure system. It is in no way intended to deprive
them of the option to impose this system on themselves if they wish to do so.
An issuer’s compliance with its own country’s disclosure system is intended
as a floor, not a ceiling. 22
II. TRANSACTION LOCATION AND INVESTOR RESIDENCY BASED
CRITIQUES OF THE ISSUER NATIONALITY APPROACH
A number of commentators share my assumption and/or desire that the
nationally based mandatory system of disclosure regulation will be
maintained—thus rejecting the international uniformity and issuer choice
approaches—but disagree with issuer nationality as the correct way to
determine jurisdictional reach of each country’s regime. Their criticism of
the issuer nationality approach arises from a number of concerns, to which I
will respond below.
A. Comparability
One concern with the issuer nationality approach voiced by some
commentators is that it would result in divergent regulatory standards

21. See id.
22. See id. at 756.
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applying to different companies participating in the U.S. capital market.
Professor James Cox, in endorsing the transaction location approach, has
raised this concern most prominently. Specifically, he “question[s] whether
within a single market there can arise a reasonable pricing hierarchy among
firms according to differences in the regulatory system guiding their
disclosures.”23 He consequently counsels the SEC, at least when it comes to
accounting standards, to stay the course and press for disclosure by foreign
issuers trading in the U.S. market to be as close to U.S. disclosure as
possible.24
Professor Cox’s apparent goals in judging what is good disclosure policy
appear very close to my own:
Disclosure assumes significance not solely because investors can
avoid questionable ventures, but because it facilitates investors in
making the comparative judgments necessary for capital markets to
fulfill their allocative functions.25
He fails, however, to show that having issuers simultaneously trading in
U.S. markets that are regulated by different disclosure systems compromises
this goal in a fashion that injures either U.S. or global economic welfare.
1. Empirical Evidence
Professor Cox begins his analysis by looking at a study by Eli Amir and
others concerning the market reaction when a foreign issuer trading in the
United States files its Form 20-F. 26 Because there is typically a delay
between when the issuer discloses what it is required to disclose under its
home country regime and the filing of the 20-F, market reaction to the 20-F
filing has the potential of showing whether the additional disclosures elicited
by the U.S. requirements contain information of value to investors.
It is not clear, though, how the results of this study could bear on the
question of whether it is undesirable to have issuers trading in the same
market regulated, respectively, by two different regimes. Assume that the
U.S. disclosure requirements do elicit new information of value to
investors;27 what would that prove? It suggests that a foreign issuer that

23. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note 2, at 1202.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 1211.
26. See Eli Amir, et al., A Comparison of the Value Relevance of U.S. versus non U.S. GAAP
Accounting Measures Using Form 20-F Reconciliations, 31 J. ACCT. RES. 230 (Supp. 1993).
27. As Professor Cox candidly concedes, the Amir study actually never comes to a conclusion on
this question. See Amir, supra note 26, at 262. See also infra note 49 and accompanying text for a
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conforms with the U.S. regime would have a more accurate share price. Who
gains from this increased price accuracy, however? The regulatory incidence
analysis above shows that it is entrepreneurs and labor in the issuer’s home
country, not U.S. investors in the issuer, that are the primary gainers from the
improvement in capital allocation and reduction in the agency costs of
management that result from increased price accuracy. 28 Are these gains
greater than the costs of the additional disclosure? That is hard to know for
sure, but the socially optimal level of disclosure for issuers from most
countries is probably lower than that for U.S. issuers.29 More importantly, it
is the issuer’s home country government that represents the greatest
concentration of persons who bear both the benefits and the costs of the level
at which the issuer discloses, and so that government’s determination of costs
and benefits implicit in its own disclosure requirements should be privileged
over the U.S. government’s implicit determination.30
Professor Cox also reviews empirical literature concerning share price
reactions when a foreign issuer decides to list its shares on a U.S. exchange
or upgrade its over-the-counter trading status, in each case triggering for the
first time the obligation to file a Form 20-F. 31 The studies show that share

discussion of other literature concerning this question. Nevertheless, it is very difficult to imagine that,
as a whole, the more extensive disclosure requirements of the United States do not elicit at least some
information helpful for increasing the accuracy of assessments of an issuer’s future cash flows.
28. See supra Part I.B.
29. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 3, at 757-60.
30. Professor Cox, in critiquing my arguments for the issuer-nationality approach, states:
An obvious concern with [the Fox and other approaches] is that the regulating state is not,
when a secondary listing is involved, the same state as that where either the investors or the
secondary market is located. This permits the regulating state to regulate without having to be
politically responsive to all those who are impacted by its regulations.
Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note 2, at 1252 n.98. In fact, concern with where the impact of
disclosure regulation will be is what has driven my entire scholarly effort in the area of disclosure
regulation in a world of globalizing securities markets. Professor Cox makes this statement without
acknowledging my conclusion that the state where the secondary market and the investor are located is
not affected in any important way by the disclosure practices of foreign issuers and without trying to
respond in any way to the anaylsis I use to reach this conclusion. See, Fox, Political Economy, supra
note 3 at 732-739 and Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 3, at 2552-80 (discussing
the points of which are summarized in the regulatory incidence analysis in supra Part I.B). Professor
Cox also states that I argue foreign issuers making “secondary listings will pressure their home state
authorities to address any harmful laxness in their regulations.” Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note
2, at 1229 n.98. I make no such argument. Indeed, I share his skepticism issuer managers would find it
in their best interests to disclose at the socially optimal level. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note
3, at 746-54; Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 3, at 1342-68. My real argument is the
much less controversial one that, given that the foreign issuer’s home government represents the
individuals who will enjoy the primary benefits from its issuers disclosing at a socially optimal level,
the home government is better positioned than U.S. authorities to determine what that level is. Fox,
Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 3, at 2580-2608.
31. See Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note 2, at 1217-23.
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price reacts positively to such a decision, but again this really proves nothing
concerning the question of whether it is undesirable to have issuers that trade
in the same market disclose under two regimes. To start, as Cox admits, the
positive price reaction may be due entirely to the increased liquidity that
accompanies this decision. Equally important, the sample involves an
extraordinarily strong self-selection bias. The manager of an issuer making
this decision is doing so despite the personally disagreeable increased
disclosure involved. She presumably does so because she expects that the
U.S. listing or trading status upgrade will be sufficiently positive for the
shareholders so that on balance she will benefit too. It would be very
surprising if the market’s evaluation of the move would not correlate
positively with hers. There are a number of reasons why such a move can be
good for shareholders. In addition to liquidity gains, the decision may signal
something positive about future cash flows.32 It may also be that this
company’s optimal disclosure level is indeed higher than what is required by
its home country, but this says nothing about the optimal disclosure levels of
compatriot firms that do not choose to list on a U.S. exchange or upgrade
their over-the-counter trading status. U.S. investors might wish to buy, or
trade in, the shares of these compatriot firms as well.
2. Regulatory Competition
After his review of this empirical literature, Professor Cox considers the
theoretical issues underlying the question of whether having issuers
disclosing under two regimes in the same market is undesirable. In the first
part of his more theoretical analysis, Cox considers regulatory competition.
In doing so, he unfortunately confuses the rationales underlying issuer
nationality approach with the rationales underlying issuer choice approach.
He states that both approaches depend on a belief that regulatory competition
is likely to promote optimal disclosure standards.33 In reality, while the issuer
choice approach depends on this belief, the issuer nationality approach most
decidedly does not. Cox then goes on to present a sharp critique of the logic
behind the belief in regulatory competition, a critique with which I largely
agree. Indeed, I have argued extensively that one of the virtues of the issuer
nationality approach is that it frustrates regulatory competition,34 and Roberta
Romano, one of the primary proponents of issuer choice, has criticized the
issuer nationality approach specifically because it has this capacity to

32. See Fürst, supra note 2 (on file with author).
33. See Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note 2, at 1230.
34. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 3, at 746-57, 766-97.
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frustrate regulatory competition. 35
3. Market Efficiency and Noise Theory
In contrast to regulatory competition, the issues of market efficiency and
noise theory clearly are relevant to the desirability of both the issuer
nationality and issuer choice approaches. Cox claims that we lack adequate
evidence of market efficiency with respect to the implications of different
issuers operating under different disclosure regimes to undertake safely either
proposed reform. 36 Adequacy is in the eyes of the beholder, but the evidence
here is more substantial than Professor Cox suggests. The whole structure of
the contemporary U.S. disclosure regime—with its short form and shelf
registration for established issuers, as well as the other reforms that arose out
of the integrated disclosure movement—relies on the assumption of market
efficiency, at least with respect to affirmative disclosures made in SEC
periodic disclosure filings. The SEC thought the body of theoretical and
empirical work in financial economics supporting this assumption
sufficiently sound to justify these reforms at the time they were enacted, and
few commentators currently are calling for their rollback based on second
thoughts about the assumption’s validity. The same body of work provides
an equally secure base for the assumption that the market will be efficient
with respect to the implications of different disclosure regimes. Consider
specifically what is at stake here: a laxer regime simply permits an issuer to
avoid comment concerning a matter about which a stricter regime would
require the issuer to say something. The market should be just as efficient in
the unbiased processing of the implications of such absences of comment as
it is in processing the affirmative disclosures required under the U.S. regime.
Prices will be less accurate under the lax regime, i.e., often further from a
share’s actual value one way or the other, but they will still be unbiased. 37

35. See Romano, supra note 2, at 2426-27.
36. See Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note 2, at 1234.
37. According to the efficient market hypothesis, the price at which an issuer’s shares trade will
be unbiased whether there is a great deal of information available about the issuer or very little. By
“unbiased,” I mean that the price, on average, is equal to the share’s actual value; i.e., what the future
income stream accruing to the holder of the share—its dividends and other distributions—turns out to
be, discounted to present value. Speculators—the persons whose actions in the market set prices—
assess what this future income stream will be based not only on what information is available about the
issuer but also on what is information not available. The empirical literature testing the efficient
market hypothesis suggests that the inferences that speculators draw from issuer disclosures are in fact
unbiased. Because there is no reason to believe that their inferences from issuer absences of comment
are any more likely to be biased than their inferences from issuer disclosures, this literature suggests as
well that the inferences they draw from issuer absences of comment are also unbiased. I discuss these
points in more detail elsewhere. See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 3, at
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Professor Cox also raises the question of noise theory. Noise theorists
believe that share prices are affected by the irrational expectations of naive
speculative traders, who act on the basis of fads, fashions, and irrational
psychological predispositions.38 Cox suggests that the findings of the noise
theorists “do not support subjecting investors to multiple disclosure
standards.”39 A careful investigation of the implications of noise theory does
not suggest that it in fact undermines the case for the issuer nationality
approach. 40 As has been analyzed above, the primary impact of any
inaccuracy in an issuer’s share price will be on the entrepreneurs and labor in
the issuer’s home country. This analysis in no way depends on the inaccuracy
being induced by the trading of entirely rational investors who simply have a
low level of information rather than by noise trading.
There is thus no reason to take into account in the design of U.S.
disclosure policy the possibility that noise may influence the share prices of
foreign issuers trading in the U.S. market unless the noise makes the prices
unfair to U.S. investors. Since noise is as likely to cause prices to be too low
as too high, the proposition that share prices on average equal actual value
still holds even if the noise theorists’ description of the world is correct.41
Thus noise poses no problem even for the most unsophistsicated U.S.
investor unless she engages in naive speculation by trying to beat the market
through following the fads and fashions. The long term investor, the dart
thrower, and the index fund investor are no worse off with the noise than
they would be without it. The naive speculator will be hurt by relying on the
fads and fashions because there will be smart money traders who are ready to
take trading positions opposite the naive speculator and wait out the fad. The
fact that investors, through this kind of naive speculation, can lose wealth to

2533-39.
Professor Cox suggests that the validity of the integrated disclosure reforms depends only on the
market being informationally efficient, whereas issuer nationality requires securities to be priced in a
fundamental value efficient market. See Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note 2, at 1247. It is unclear,
however, what the reasons are for believing there is a difference in the kind of market efficiency
required to justify the two reforms. Prices in a market that is informationally efficient but not
fundamental value efficient still are unbiased in the sense of being as likely to be below actual value as
above. The difference is that, unlike the price in a fundamentally efficient market, price in a market
that is only informationally efficient is not necessarily the most accurate assessment of actual value
that can be made given available information.
38. See, e.g., Fisher Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986).
39. See Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note 2, at 1234, 1246-47.
40. The points that follow in the text summarize a more extensive discussion of mine concerning
why noise theory does not undermine the argument that the issuer’s home country has the greatest
interest in its disclosure level. See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 3, at 2536-37
n.76, 2555 n.103.
41. See id.
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others in this fashion does not in my view suggest that noise introduces into
the market any kind of structural unfairness.42 The better public policy
response to concerns about the plight of naive speculators is an adequate
public education effort against the dangers of such speculation and regulation
of brokers and investment advisors who promote it inappropriately.
Moreover, even if one does consider it unfair that naive speculators lose
money in this fashion, there is no sound theoretical reason to believe a priori
that increased disclosure is any more likely to alleviate the unfairness than to
exacerbate it. This is because one of the effects of increased disclosure will
be to reduce the riskiness for smart money speculators to engage in the
trading activities that move wealth to themselves from the naive traders.43
4. Risk Reduction for the Undiversified Investor
The final theoretical issue considered by Professor Cox concerns the
effect of multiple disclosure regimes on undiversified investors.44
Admittedly, permitting foreign issuers to trade in U.S. markets, while
disclosing under their less rigorous home country regimes, will make easily
available to U.S. investors securities with share prices that are less accurate
than they would be if these issuers were subject to the U.S. regime. While
this will not add to the risk incurred by fully diversified investors, it will add
risk to the portfolios of investors in these stocks who are undiversified, which
reduces their expected utility. Greater disclosure by foreign issuers under the
transaction location approach would benefit these less than fully diversified
U.S. investors by reducing the unsystematic risk in their portfolios.
It is unlikely, however, that this gain is worth the costs of the transaction
location approach, particularly because the same gain—the reduction of
unsystematic risk—can be achieved just as effectively by a program of
educational and institutional reform that will encourage U.S. investors to
diversify. The costs of the transaction location approach are substantial. If the
U.S. policy imposes its regime on all foreign issuers whose shares are offered

42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note 2, at 1234-35. Professor Cox also suggests that
allowing foreign issuers to trade in the United States while disclosing at the lower level required by
their home country regimes will permit more fraudulent offerings to succeed and thereby will switch
regulation from playing the ex ante prophylactic role that the SEC-reviewed registered public offering
process provides to playing the ex post deterrence role that litigation provides. See id. at 1235-36.
Again, however, if it turns out that ex post litigation-based regulation is socially inferior, it is
entrepreneurs and labor in the home country that will pay the price. Investors will be protected because
the higher risk that an investment in a foreign issuer will produce no returns except those derived out
of a high-transaction-cost law suit will be discounted in the initial price of foreign-issuer shares.
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or traded in the United States, many foreign issuers will seek to avoid the
U.S. regime, keeping their shares out of the U.S. market. This hurts U.S.
investors, who are better off when shares of additional issuers are made
available, even if these additional issuers only disclose at a very low level. 45
The loss in U.S. investor utility from a smaller number of foreign issuers’
shares being available may be greater than the gain in such utility from the
increased disclosure by foreign issuers that do make their shares available.
Thus, U.S. investors can actually be made worse off by applying the U.S.
regime to foreign issuers. When U.S. foreign relations and global economic
welfare considerations are taken into account, the costs to the United States
in applying its regime to foreign issuers is even greater. Imposition of the
U.S. regime requires the issuer to disclose more than officials in the issuer’s
own country have determined is cost effective. At least in the eyes of these
foreign officials, this higher level of disclosure required by the United States
costs more than it is worth and thus reduces the net returns to capital utilizing
productive activities in their own country. This damages the issuer country’s
entrepreneurs, suppliers of labor and, if the issuer has previously gone public
at home, suppliers of capital.
These foreign relations problems will be severely exacerbated by the
growing globalization of financial information and the declining difficulty
and expense of effecting share transactions abroad. If the United States is
serious about protecting undiversified U.S. investors, it will switch from the
transaction location approach that Professor Cox is currently advocating to
the investor residency approach. If the United States follows Professor Cox’s
approach, the U.S. regime would be applied to foreign issuers with greater
and greater frequency whether or not they actively target U.S. investors in
their offerings or actively encourage secondary trading of their shares among
U.S. investors. Each additional application is objectionable to the issuer’s
home country, as its residents suffer the welfare loss from the issuer
disclosing more than is socially optimal. This is particularly true because the
U.S. regime is imposed to cure the purely domestic U.S. problem of
inadequate investor diversification.

45. Whatever level of disclosure is imposed on the issuer, each additional investment opportunity
available to U.S. investors that a share value maximizing firm finds worth selling into a market with
unbiased pricing represents an increase in demand for savings. It therefore marginally raises the
overall market expected rate of return available to every such investor. Also, each additional
investment opportunity has a future return generated by a probability distribution with somewhat
different variance-covariance characteristics than any existing opportunity and therefore permits
investors to compose portfolios with more favorable tradeoffs between risk and return than otherwise
would have been available. For a more formal elaboration of these points, see Fox, Disclosure in a
Globalizing Market, supra note 3, at 2542-44.
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5. Network Externalities
Professor Jack Coffee has made a somewhat different comparability
based argument for the transaction location approach:
An initial “network externality” is the advantage of complementarity.
As issuers conform to common disclosure, accounting, and listing
standards, investors gain the ability to compare securities in a common
language and scoring system. Inherently, investors need to compare
security A against security B and this task becomes quicker and easier
as more issuers converge to [common] . . . disclosure and accounting
standards.46
Coffee undoubtedly has a point here, after all, providing a common
language is one rationale for nationally based mandatory disclosure in the
first place.47 The question is: how important is it to achieve greater
commonality than now exists? A major portion of the capitalized value of the
world’s publicly traded equities is issued by issuers subject to the regimes of
a relatively small number of major capitalist countries.48 There is evidence,
for example, that speculators–the persons whose trading sets prices–are
“multilingual” in sufficient number that the share price accuracy of foreign
issuers trading in the United States is not significantly enhanced by their
provision of U.S. GAAP reconciliation, which is currently required. 49 Coffee
suggests that the efforts these speculators undertake to effect their
translations is a waste.50 However, the waste may not be that significant
because only a limited number of such speculators are needed to achieve
price efficiency. It is likely to pale in comparison to the costs, considered
above, of imposing U.S. standards on foreign issuers.51 Moreover, if the

46. Coffee, supra note 2, at 694.
47. Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and The Protection of Investors,
70 VA . L. REV. 669, 685-87 (1984).
48. At year-end 1994, the “G7” countries (the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom,
France, Italy, Japan, and Germany) together accounted for 75 percent of the world’s total market
capitalization of nearly U.S. $15.2 trillion. I NTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, EMERGING
STOCK MARKETS FACTBOOK 1995, at 15 (1995).
49. One way to test this proposition is to compare, for foreign issuers listed on a U.S. exchange,
the response of their share prices when they originally announce their earnings prepared on the basis of
home country conventions, with the response of their share prices when they subsequently announce
these earnings reconciled with U.S. GAAP. Gary Meek performed such a test and found that the price
response to the first announcement suggests it has considerable information value, while there was not
a statistically significant price response to the second announcement. See Gary K. Meek, U.S.
Securities Market Responses to Alternate Earnings Disclosures of Non-U.S. Multinational
Corporations, 58 T HE ACCT. REV. 394 (Apr. 1983).
50. Coffee, supra note 2, at 694.
51. See supra Part II.A.3 notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
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network externalities from foreign issuer compliance with U.S. standards are,
in fact, as significant as Coffee suggests, the transaction location approach
will not be necessary to maintain the benefits of comparable disclosure, at
least now that the network externalities involving comparable disclosure are
already firmly established in the U.S. market. Foreign issuers will
affirmatively want to take advantage of these externalities by joining the
group, which, under the issuer nationality approach, they would be free to do.
Coffee goes on to suggest that additional network externalities exist
because all issuers that trade in the U.S. market contribute to its “reputational
capital” by adhering to strict U.S. disclosure rules.52 Again, this is not a
compelling argument for a well-established market like the one for securities
in the United States. The speculative traders who set price distinguish among
existing firms in the U.S. market along thousands of different lines including
type of industry, character of management, quality of management,
potentially threatening new technologies, corporate charter provisions, etc. It
is hard to see why they could not distinguish along one more dimension:
strictness of applicable disclosure regime.
B. Bonding and Private Information Revelation
Another rationale for the transaction location approach, suggested by both
Professors Coffee and Rock, is that it allows foreign issuers to impose on
themselves the U.S. disclosure regime. Because such a move is hard to
reverse, it permits a foreign issuer to make a bond to the market that the
issuer will continue to provide the higher, U.S. level of required information
over a long period of time.53 It is plausible that many foreign issuers listing in
the United States were motivated to do so at least in part by a desire to make
such a bond, but preserving the opportunity for foreign issuers to engage in
such bonding does not require the transaction location approach. Bonding is
equally available under the issuer nationality approach as long as these firms
have the option, as I recommend, to impose the U.S. regime on themselves.54
Professor Oren Fürst shows similar enthusiasm for the United States
preserving the transaction location approach because it enables highly
profitable foreign firms to convey credibly private information regarding
their firms’ future prospects by choosing to list their shares in the United
States and thereby impose on themselves the strict U.S. disclosure regime.55

52.
53.
54.
55.

See Coffee, supra note 2, at 694.
See id. at 691-92; Rock, supra note 2.
See infra Part I.C.3.
Fürst, supra note 2, at 1.
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Again, the issuer nationality approach offers these highly profitable foreign
firms the same opportunity as long as the option exists to impose the U.S.
regime on themselves.
C. Administration and Enforcement
Professor Cox’s support of the transaction location approach over the
issuer nationality approach is also based on his concern that the issuer
nationality approach would create difficult problems of administration and
enforcement.56 Professor Karmel has endorsed the transaction location
approach on similar grounds, stating that “it has made for relative certainty in
structuring transactions, and it has avoided conflicts and tensions between the
SEC and foreign regulators.”57 Cox gives as his example the problems of a
U.S. issuer making a public offering in France, which under the issuer
nationality approach would be governed by the U.S. disclosure regime. Cox
suggests that if the issuer violated the U.S. rules and the United States
brought an action, it would “pose terrific political and international issues
these authors [the reference includes both myself and authors proposing the
issuer choice approach] do not address.”58 Again, it appears that Professor
Cox has confused the issuer nationality and issuer choice approaches even
though they differ significantly with regard to this matter.59 As I analyzed in
an earlier work, a U.S. enforcement action against such a U.S. issuer would
be fully justified under international law pursuant to the “nationality”
principle,60 a universally accepted principle that allows a state to prescribe
conduct by its nationals, whether inside or outside the state.61 I have analyzed

56. See Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note 2, at 1239-42.
57. Karmel, supra note 2, at 3.
58. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note 2, at 1240.
59. Cox’s confusion between the issuer-nationality approach and the issuer-choice approach is
suggested by his statement, “[g]reater extraterritorial breadth is recognized with respect to powers of a
state over its citizens abroad, but this is not the relationship we find with the Dutch corporation
purporting to invoke U.S. disclosure standards in its French offering.” Id. at 1252 n.130 (emphasis
added). In this statement, Cox appears to agree with my position that there is no international law
problem with the United States enforcing its regime against a disclosure violation by a U.S. issuer
making an offering in France, which is all that the issuer-nationality approach calls for.
60. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 3, at 727. Ironically, it is the transaction location
approach that, when applied to secondary trading of foreign issuer shares in the United States, can
create problems under international law. These problems arise where neither the issuer nor anyone
contractually related to it offered, sold, or promoted the trading of its shares in the United States, yet
organized trading in the issuer’s shares nevertheless developed in the United States. In that situation,
the issuer has undertaken no conduct occurring within the United States. The nationality principle
obviously does not work either. And the substantial effects principle is only of debatable help. See id.
at 724-27.
61. See RESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §402(2)
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the political ramifications of the issuer nationality approach as well,62 and
applying that analysis, it is hard to imagine how such an action by the United
States is likely to raise major political problems with France.63 Is France
really going to object if a U.S. issuer making an offering in France discloses
more than what French law requires?64 And if the French wish the U.S. issuer
to say something more than the U.S. regime requires, the U.S. adoption of
the issuer nationality approach in no way stops them.
Moreover, Professor Cox’s choice of example here is odd. His entire
article concerns the problems he sees in having domestic issuers disclosing
under the U.S. regime and foreign issuers disclosing under their respective
home country regimes trading simultaneously in the U.S. market, not the
French market. Thus the example more relevant to the concerns of his article
would be a French issuer making a public offering in the United States,
which under the issuer nationality approach would be governed by the
French disclosure regime. Would the United States, which by the very
adoption of the issuer nationality approach chose to leave the regulation of
such an issuer to its home country authorities, object if French authorities
took action? Of course not.
It should also be noted that among the three approaches to statutory reach,
the issuer nationality approach provides for the most practical administration
of disclosure regulations in a globalizing era. U.S. authorities would be
responsible only for issuers located in the United States. These are the issuers
that U.S. authorities best understand. They are also the issuers who are

(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The nationality principle involves “determining jurisdiction by
reference to the nationality or national character of the person committing the offense”; The Harvard
Research on International Law: Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 29 AM. J. INT’ L L., Supp. 1, 435, 445
(1935). It is described by commentators as “universally accepted.” Id. Professor Cox suggests that this
does not constitute adequate authority because I do not “consider well recognized limits on a nation’s
jurisdiction to enforce its prescriptions,” Cox, Regulatory Duopoly, supra note 2, at 1252 n.126, but he
ultimately makes nothing of this distinction, citing the same section of the RESTATEMENTas I do and
even making reference to the nationality principle as one of “the five bases for claiming jurisdiction
under international law.” Id. at 1241 n.130.
62. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 2, at 735-36.
63. Professor Cox is silent about exactly what he thinks the “terrific” political issues might be.
64. The only French group who possibly could be injured by extending U.S. disclosure
requirements to U.S. issuers whose shares are offered in the French market are persons who profit
from the volume of securities transactions effected in France. With the issuer nationality approach,
U.S. issuers will no longer have an incentive to evade U.S. disclosure rules by offering and promoting
the trade of their shares abroad. Thus, the proposed switch in approach would diminish the volume of
U.S. issuer share transactions located in other countries. This injury is not a legitimate basis for other
countries to protest the proposed extension of the U.S. requirements. Between countries, volume is a
zero-sum game. It should be won or lost based on the cost and quality of the transactional services
available in each country, not on the ability of one country to offer a way to evade regulations of
another country aimed at behavior that primarily affects the welfare of residents of the country whose
regulations are being evaded.
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easiest for U.S. authorities to investigate, because their records and principal
employees are likely to be located in the United States, and whose cases
would be the easiest to prosecute, because potential witnesses and defendants
mostly reside within the jurisdiction.
Also, contrary to Professor Karmel’s concerns, the issuer nationality
approach would lead to the most, not the least, certainty in structuring
transactions, because in the age of the Internet, there is likely to be much
more ambiguity as to the place of a transaction than as to the nationality of
the issuer.65
III. ABANDONING NATIONALLY BASED MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
The issuer nationality approach has also been subject to more radical
critiques, both from the right and from the left. From the right, advocates of
the issuer choice approach argue that the United States regime should no
longer be mandatory and that any issuer, U.S. or foreign, should be allowed
to avoid the U.S. regime if it chooses instead to subject itself to the regime of
one of the fifty states or of any other country. 66 From the left, advocates of
international uniformity argue that mandatory disclosure should be retained
but that all issuers worldwide should be subject to the same regime.67 I will

65. See Blake, supra note 2; Fox, Political Economy, supra note 3, at 780-82.
66. Recently, Professors Choi, Guzman & Romano have made fully elaborated proposals for full
scale issuer choice. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 2; Romano, supra note 2. Professor Palmiter has
recommended that issuers be able to opt out of the federal mandatory disclosure system, but only for
the offering of securities, not for periodic disclosure. Palmiter, supra note 2, at 86-101. Professor
Palmiter’s primary concern does not appear to be transnational securities transactions, however. See id.
These recent proposals have less-elaborated historical antecedents. See Joseph A. Grundfest,
Internationalization of the World’s Securities Markets: Causes and Regulatory Consequences, in
I NTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 349 (Marvin H. Kosters & Allan H.
Meltzer eds., 1991); Nicholas Demmo, U.S. Securities Regulation: The Need For Modification to Keep
Pace with Globalization, 17 U. P A . J. INT’ L ECON . L. 691, 720 (1996).
67. See, e.g., Geiger, supra note 2; Steinberg & Michaels, supra note 2, at 261-65 (the world’s
countries, by self-selection, would be divided into three groups—developed market, semi-developed
market and emerging market —and each group would work out uniform disclosure rules for its
countries’ issuers that would permit sale and trading of their securities anywhere within the group).
IOSCO, a worldwide organization of countries that provides a forum for meetings of the securities
regulators of member states, initially undertook a straddle in which it urged countries either to adopt
uniform rules (international uniformity) or reciprocity (essentially the issuer nationality approach).
I NTERNATIONAL EQUITY OFFERS, REPORT OF THE T ECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF IOSCO (Sept. 1989),
cited in Steinberg & Michaels, supra note 2, at 241. IOSCO, in cooperation with IASC, is seeking to
develop a recommended set of international accounting standards and has developed a set of nonfinancial disclosure standards that could be used in a single uniform disclosure document for crossborder offerings, and thus has tilted toward international uniformity as the preferred result. See
IOSCO, I NTERNATIONAL EQUITY OFFERS, REPORT OF THE T ECHNICAL COMMITTEE (Sept. 1989)
(available from www.iosco.org), discussed in Michel Hurley, International Debt and Equity Markets,
8 EMORY I NT’ L L. REV. 701, 733 (1994); Steinberg & Michaels, supra note 2, at 241, 243-46; Roberta
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consider each approach in turn.
A. Issuer Choice
1. Comparing the Two Approaches as Responses to Globalization
The current U.S. approach to statutory reach has a significant transaction
location component to it.68 As a result, a foreign issuer wishing to offer its
shares in the United States or to have them trade on a U.S. stock exchange or
NASDAQ must, under the current U.S. approach to statutory reach, comply
with the requirements of the U.S. disclosure regime.69 Under issuer choice, as
proposed by both Professor Romano and by Professors Choi and Guzman,
the foreign issuer would be able to choose its own country’s regime instead.70
They each argue that this would improve international capital mobility and
reduce costs because foreign issuers no longer would be deterred by the U.S.
regime’s high disclosure requirements71 from entering U.S. markets or
seeking U.S. investors. These are indeed valuable benefits, but they are
equally obtainable under the issuer nationality approach. Thus, the
globalization of the market for securities does not form a basis for choosing
one approach over the other. The decision must be based on other
considerations.
2. An Issuer Nationality Critique of Issuer Choice
I recently have written extensively on the question of issuer choice.72
Thus, I will comment here only briefly why I believe that issuer choice is the
inferior way to improve international capital mobility and to eliminate the
cost for issuers of complying with more than one regulatory regime.
Professor Romano argues that issuer choice would lead to jurisdictions
competing to offer issuers regulations that maximize share value.73
Professors Choi and Guzman argue that it would lead to a diversity of
available regimes and permit each issuer to select the one best suited to its
particular needs.74 Neither argument, however, adequately takes into account
the fact that issuer choice would result in each issuer selecting a regime

S. Karmel, The IOSCO Venice Conference, N.Y. L.J. Oct. 19, 1989, at 3.
68. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 3, at 705-17.
69. See id.
70. See Romano, supra note 2, at 2361-62; Choi & Guzman, supra note 2, at 907.
71. See Romano, supra note 2, at 2419-20; Choi & Guzman, supra note 2, at 922-23.
72. See Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 3.
73. See Romano, supra note 2, at 2362.
74. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 2, at 916-17.
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requiring it to disclose at less than its socially optimal level. This is because
each issuer’s private costs of disclosure exceed the social costs of its
disclosure, while its private benefits are less than the social benefits.
This divergence between private and social costs and benefits means that
the current system of mandatory disclosure should be retained. The issuer
nationality approach is the best way to retain it while enhancing international
capital mobility and eliminating the costs of issuer compliance with multiple
regimes. This is so unless the proponents of issuer choice can show either
that the current system causes issuers to deviate even more (just in the
opposite direction) from their optimal disclosure levels than would issuer
choice, or that issuer choice has some other redeeming feature outweighing
its underdisclosure effect. So far they have not done so, and a careful analysis
of the empirical evidence and the theoretical considerations bearing on these
questions strongly suggests that such a showing is not possible.75
3. Issuer Choice Critiques of Issuer Nationality
Professors Choi and Guzman provide the most comprehensive issuer
choice based critique of the issuer nationality approach. 76 They start by
suggesting that I champion the issuer nationality approach over the issuer
choice approach to avoid the “race to the bottom.”77 I have in fact used this
phrase, but primarily in connection with the consequences of globalization on
U.S. disclosure standards under a transaction location approach. 78 With
regard to issuer choice, however, the phrase does not accurately describe my
concern. Assuming for a moment that a diverse set of regimes does in fact
remain after a switch to issuer choice including some regimes requiring a
high level of disclosure (a possible, though not inevitable, state of affairs
after the switch),79 the exact nature of any given regime and whether it has
moved downward does not really matter. What matters is the nature of the

75. See Fox, Returning Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 3, at 1342-1410.
76. Choi & Guzman, supra note 2, at 948-50.
77. See id. at 948.
78. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 3, at 766-97.
79. There is also the distinct possibility that issuer choice will lead to a convergence of disclosure
regimes with each jurisdiction competing to attract the maximum number of issuers by trying to appeal
to the broadest possible segment of the market. This would be accomplished by offering a regime that
minimizes the average distance between its requirements and the preferences of each of the world’s
issuers. U.S. issuers would move from being regulated by a standard designed for the average U.S.
issuer to being regulated by one designed for the average issuer worldwide. This would reduce, not
enhance, U.S. welfare because the only effective choices then available to U.S. issuers would likely
have requirements further from these issuers’ socially optimal level of disclosure than is the current
U.S. mandatory regime. I discuss these points more fully in Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure,
supra note 3, at 1396-1404.
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particular regime each issuer chooses. My concern is that, because each
issuer’s private costs of disclosure exceed the social costs of its disclosure,
while its private benefits are less than the social benefits, the resulting market
failure will lead each issuer to choose a regime requiring it to disclose less
than is socially optimal. Thus, the problem is not so much that regimes would
march lock-step to the bottom, but that each issuer would choose a regime
with disclosure requirements a notch or two below what is socially optimal
for that particular issuer.
Professors Choi and Guzman also suggest that I ignore the possibility of a
“race to the top” resulting from regimes competing to attract investors and
issuers with value maximizing managers.80 And they suggest that I deny an
issuer “with a very high quality offering” the opportunity of being governed
by a very strict regime.81 I have two responses. First, I am not sure what a
“race to the top” would look like, but I am sure that Professors Choi and
Guzman would agree that it would not be a good thing for all regimes to
require a high level of disclosure. Second, given the divergence between
social and private costs and benefits, issuers are not looking for disclosure
regimes requiring more disclosure than is socially optimal for them. Hence,
there is certainly no force within the system to push all jurisdictions to higher
requirements. My proposal, however, does make room for issuers whose
managers would prefer a stricter disclosure regime than is offered by their
home jurisdictions. Such issuers have the option to impose on themselves the
U.S. regime.82 Thus, to the extent that issuers display a demand for highdisclosure regimes and that jurisdictions indeed do seek to enlarge the
number of issuers utilizing their regimes, jurisdictions’ incentives under the
issuer nationality approach to provide high disclosure regimes will be at least
as great as under the issuer choice approach.
Professors Choi and Guzman’s last critique of the issuer nationality
approach, a point raised by Professor Romano as well, is that issuer
nationality eliminates the incentives that competition provides regulatory
authorities to avoid the overly burdensome regulation that these authorities
otherwise might prefer.83 This point may or may not be valid, but it is
certainly unproven. In essence, the issuer choice advocates assume a public
choice type governmental failure under the issuer nationality approach, while
they ignore the market failure that arises under issuer choice. They neither
work out the case that public choice factors would in fact lead to too high a

80.
81.
82.
83.

Choi & Guzman, supra note 2, at 949.
See id.
See supra Part I.C. notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
See Choi & Guzman, supra note 2, at 749-50; Romano, supra note 2, at 2362.
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level of required disclosure, nor show that if it does, the problem is more
serious than the market failure that is the traditional justification of
mandatory disclosure in the first place.84
B. International Uniformity
Proponents of the international uniformity approach believe that the
United States should work with other countries to develop a globally uniform
disclosure regime.85 One way to accomplish this would be through each
country adopting substantively identical rules (“harmonization”) that would
then be applied by national governments in accordance with any of the three
principles of jurisdictional reach outlined above.86 Another way would be to
establish an international agency that would develop and apply its own
regime, which would replace the existing nationally based regimes.
1. Comparing the Two Approaches as Responses to Globalization
In a world in which the market for the shares of an increasing number of
issuers is becoming global, uniform disclosure standards would, in
comparison to a nationally based system of mandatory disclosure utilizing
the transaction location or investor residency approaches, reduce barriers to

84. I am skeptical of both these points. See Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 3,
at 1416-19.
85. See supra note 67.
86. The SEC, and some key persons who have been associated with the SEC, have professed
interest in disclosure rules being internationally uniform, but want the rules to be as close as possible
to the current U.S. rules. See Regulation of International Securities Markets, SEC Release No. 33-6807
(Nov. 14, 1988) (laying out a preference for uniformity in broad terms); James R. Doty, The Role of
the SEC in an Internationalized Marketplace, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S77, S78, S85, S86 (1992); Simon
M. Lorne, Current Trends in International Securities Regulation, 28 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 453 (1995).
Adherents of this position are, in a sense, “trying to have their cake and eat it too.” They really are
seeking to achieve the same goals as are served by the investor residency and transaction location
approaches: assuring U.S. resident investors wherever they buy, and investors from anywhere who
utilize U.S. markets, that the issuers (whether U.S. or foreign) whose stock they buy provide
traditional U.S. level disclosure. At the same time, they seek to eliminate the existing barrier—the
difference between U.S and foreign disclosure standards—that keeps most foreign issuers away from
U.S. markets, a barrier that deprives the U.S. securities industry of business and limits or makes more
expensive for U.S. investors a variety of foreign investment opportunities. The problem with this
position is that foreign countries are unlikely to agree to rules that come close to U.S. standard because
the optimal disclosure level for their issuers is lower abroad than in the United States. See infra notes
88-91; Licht, Games, supra note 2 (discussing models of the bargaining dynamics and competitive
factors that would shape whether there would be convergence of disclosure rules); Fox, Political
Economy, supra note 3, at 757-65 (describing the unlikelihood of international agreement on uniform
rules); id. at 766-85 and 799-822 (describing the likelihood that absent a switch to the issuer
nationality approach, globalization will lead to a lowering of the traditional U.S. level of required
disclosure).

p567 Fox.doc

594

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

4/23/01 4:05 PM

[VOL. 78:567

capital mobility and provide administrative convenience by saving issuers the
need to comply with multiple national regimes.87 Uniform disclosure
standards would not, however, be any more effective at reducing the barriers
to capital mobility than a nationally based system using the issuer nationality
approach. And a nationally based system using the issuer nationality
approach would be significantly more convenient administratively than an
international regime, because dealings between the entrepreneurs or
managers of the issuers and the officials regulating them would be between
persons who share a common culture, language, and understanding of
business practices.88
2. Other Considerations
Thus again, if a choice is to be made between issuer nationality and
international uniformity, it must be made on other grounds. Here, each
approach has its relative advantages. The key advantage of the issuer
nationality approach is that there are likely to be important differences
among issuers worldwide in terms of the level of disclosure that will
maximize the returns, net of the costs of this disclosure, that their capitalutilizing productive activities generate. These differences in their socially
optimal disclosure levels are significantly related to the nationalities of the
issuers involved because they arise out of differences in the corporate
governance regimes of the different countries. Disclosure is of more value,
for example, in a market centered economy than in a bank centered one, and
therefore, despite the higher costs of greater disclosure, issuers in a marketcentered economy will tend to have a higher socially optimal level of
disclosure.89

87. See, e.g., Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 336568, 1985 SEC LEXIS 2074 (February 28, 1985) (suggesting agreement among several countries on
a single prospectus format and common disclosure standards as one possible approach to facilitating
multinational offerings). See also John M. Fontecchio, The General Agreement on Trade in Services:
Is It the Answer to Creating a Harmonized Global Securities System?, 20 N.C.J. INT’L LAW & COM.
REG . 115, 123 (1994) (suggesting that GATS be considered as a means to pull the governments of the
world toward a harmonized global securities market); Manning Gilbert Warren III, Global
Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 185, 187 (1990).
88. Professors Fanto and Karmel conducted a survey of foreign issuers that had registered their
shares with the SEC. Their results provide an example of this kind of problem. Some of the surveyed
issuers complained that the SEC staff was unfamiliar with the business, accounting and legal practices
in their countries, thereby generating more lawyer involvement and expense. See James A. Fanto &
Roberta S. Karmel, A Report on the Attitudes of Foreign Companies Regarding a U.S. Listing, 32-35,
(NYSE WORKING P APER NO . 97-101, 1997).
89. See Fox, Political Economy, supra note 3, at 758-60; Licht, International Diversity, supra
note 2, at 237-53. Steinberg and Michaels’ suggestion, discussed in note 67 supra, of three groups of
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Compared to the issuer nationality approach, the two key advantages of
international uniformity are comparability and a better capacity to deal with
transborder information externalities. We have already discussed why the
need for comparability is probably exaggerated. 90 Transborder externalities
are potentially a more serious concern. In a world with international trade
and multinational corporate operations, some of an issuer’s competitors,
major suppliers, and major customers may not share the issuer’s nationality
and so will not be subject to the same disclosure regime as the issuer. This
problem biases a national government downward when the national
government considers requiring a higher level of disclosure rather than a
lower one. The government knows that if it chooses the higher level, each of
the nation’s issuers will suffer the costs of all of the issuer’s competitors,
major suppliers, and major customers finding out the additional required
information, whether these competitors, suppliers, or customers are domestic
or foreign. But each of the nation’s issuers will enjoy the benefit of finding
out the additional required information only from those of its competitors,
major suppliers, and major customers that share its nationality. Thus, there is
a transborder externality associated with the national government’s decision
setting the level of disclosure for its issuers. The government will choose the
level that will maximize the welfare of its residents. It will not account for
the benefits from additional disclosure that would be enjoyed by its issuers’
foreign competitors, major suppliers, and major customers of its issuers. The
process by which a uniform international standard would be set, whether by
international negotiation or by an international agency, would internalize this
transborder externality and thus eliminate the bias.91

countries self-identified in terms of market development each developing its own uniform rules
appears to be a compromise between fully accounting for national differences among issuers and
having full international uniformity. Steinberg & Michaels, supra note 2, at 261-65. It is not clear that
the tradeoff that they propose is particularly helpful, however. First, national differences in socially
optimal disclosure levels differ for many reasons other than level of market development: the United
States, Germany and Japan are illustrative of this point. Second, there is no reason to keep an issuer
from the emerging country group that only complies with that group’s disclosure rules from trading in
the U.S. as long as their principal trading market, wherever it is located, is efficient. See supra Parts
II.B.2 and II.C. The primary gain from transnational securities transactions for an emerging country
issuer is presumably to access capital from developed countries; an offering by such an issuer into
another emerging country would be of little value to the issuer.
90. See supra Part II.A.
91. I discuss these points in more detail elsewhere. See, Fox, Political Economy, supra note 3, at
747-49, 762-64.
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IV. CONCLUSION
I have advocated here and in prior writings the superiority of the issuer
nationality approach over the four alternatives. I cannot claim that this issuer
nationality approach is a perfect response to the problems and opportunities
posed by the globalization of the market for securities; it is just a less
imperfect response than any of the other four approaches. There are open
issues—issues that will become more pressing over time as the real economy
begins to resemble more closely the financial economy in its degree of
globalization. One is how to deal with truly transnational corporations such
as Daimler Chrysler or BP-Amoco. At the moment, such corporations
constitute only a small portion of the capitalization of the world’s
corporations, but their number is obviously growing. It is not clear whether
there is a natural limit to this kind of transnational consolidation of firms,
and, if so, where that limit is. A second question is what to do about
transborder information externalities. These too will increase with the growth
of international trade as a proportion of all economic activity, because such
growth will result in each of the world’s issuers sharing its nationality with a
smaller portion of its competitors, major suppliers, and major customers.
Neither of the trends involved in these open issues enhances the
arguments of the investor residency, transaction location, or issuer choice
approaches. Rather, both point toward an ideal of an international regime, but
one that respects differences in the socially optimal disclosure levels of
issuers from different countries. This ideal poses two huge challenges. One is
how to design such a regime. The other is how to create on the ground an
effective, responsive administering agency. The magnitude of these
challenges suggests that we will be living with a nationally based system for
some time to come and that if issuer nationality is used as the basis for
determining statutory reach, this system is preferable to a poorly designed or
implemented international regime.

